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ARE RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BURDENS ON WELFARE RECIPIENTS? AN
ANALYSIS OF THOMPSON v. SHAPIRO AND GREEN
v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF
THE STATE OF DELAWARE
As more effective legal counsel has become increasingly
available to the poor, the traditional conditions prefixed to welfare aid have been brought under heavy attack. A residence
requirement is probably the most common of such conditions
and has been the subject of recent litigation.' In Thompson v.
Shapiro2 a three-judge district court in Connecticut held unconstitutional the Connecticut statute3 which required one year of
residence in order to receive Aid to Dependent Children (ADC).
Relying upon the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment 4 to reach this result, the court found that
the statute had a "chilling effect" on the right to travel - a
right protected from state infringement by the privileges and
immunities clause. 5 The court also found no reasonable purpose
IThere are over forty states that have some type of residence requirement for receiving welfare. See Comment, Residence Requirements in State
Public Welfare Statutes, 51 IOWA L. REV. 1080 (1966); American Public
Welfare Ass'n, PUBLIC WELFARE DIRECTORY (1967).
During the writing of
this comment, there has been, in several states, litigation attacking these
requirements that has resulted in preliminary injunctions. See, e.g., Smith
v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967), appeal granted, 36 U.S.L.W.
3338 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1968) (No. 1138); Harrell v. Tobriner, Civil No. 174967 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal granted sub nom., Washington v. Harrell, 36
U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1968) (No. 1134) ; Ramos v. Social Services
Bd. of State of Wis., 276 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Wis. 1967); Mantell v. Dandridge, Civil No. 18792 (D.Md. Oct. 24, 1967) ; Johnson v. Robinson, Civil
No. 67C 1883 (N.D. Ill. Oct .30, 1967).
2270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), appeal granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3278
(U.S. Jan. 15, 1967) (No. 813).
3 CONN. GEN. STAT.

(Rev. 1958, 1965 Supp.) §17-2d:

When any person comes into this state without visible means of support for the immediate future and applies for aid to dependent children
under Chapter 301 of general assistance under Part 1 of Chapter 308
within one year from his arrival, such person shall be eligible only for
temporary aid or care until arrangements are made for his return,
provided ineligibility for aid to dependent children shall not continue
beyond the maximum federal residence requirement.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor, deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
5 The United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to use the privileges and immunities clause as a basis for its majority opinion, reflecting the
historic narrow treatment given it by the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873), which held that only a right inherent in national citizenship was protected. Only once has a majority of the Supreme Court
found a violation of the clause, and that decision was overruled approximately four years later. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled
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for the condition that would justify invocation of the police
power of the state; consequently the statute denied plaintiff the

right to equal protection of the laws.6
Vivian Marie Thompson moved from Boston, where she had
been receiving ADC payments, to Hartford, Connecticut. Upon
her change of residence, Boston discontinued aid, and Connecticut denied aid on the ground that she had not met its one-year
residence requirement, although she was apparently otherwise
eligible. The court enjoined enforcement of the residence requirement on the ground that every citizen has a right to travel,
which includes the right to establish residence in any state, and
any denial of this right or "chilling" of its exercise is a denial
of a constitutional privilege.
THE RIGHT

To

TRAVEL

The right of a citizen to travel among the states has been
by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). However, the court in Thompson pointed out that in recent opinions the Supreme Court has given strength
to the privileges and immunities clause, 270 F. Supp. 331, 335 n. 2 (D.
Conn. 1967).
'Plaintiff also argued that such denial of ADC benefits violated her
constitutional rights under the privileges and immunities clause of U.S.
CONST. art. IV, §2: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." However, the court
pointed out the inappropriateness of this argument by stating that the plaintiff was a citizen of Connecticut and the clause only prohibits discrimination
by a state against a citizen -of another state. See also Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 511
(1939) (Opinion of Roberts and Black, J.J.); New York v. O'Neill, 359
U.S. 1, 6 (1958). But consider the'view of Bernard Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests 'foir General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 567 (1966):
Residence tests for welfare programs violate the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV precisely because they impair the privilege
of free interstate movement since a potential migrant will face discriminatory treatment after he becomes a resident and therefore a citizen of the state he wishes to enter.
Id. at 608.
See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898). Query whether the Thompson court would have acquiesced to an action by plaintiff under art. IV §2
if it were filed by plaintiff before moving to Connecticut?
6 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 336 (D. Conn. 1967). The
court held that the statute, because of its arbitrary and unreasonable classification, violated the fourteenth amendment. That portion of the opinion
which deals with the equal protection argument does not provide any clear
or definitive analysis. The court held that the purpose of the Connecticut
statute was not valid nor was the statute and the regulations promulgated
under it "reasonable in light of its purpose." The court also held that the
statute arbitrarily discriminates between those entering with a cash stake
and those without such a stake. Id. at 337. This latter determination made
by the Thompson court is a result of the peculiar phrasing of the Connecticut statute which is not common among other state statutes regarding residence requirements. For a further discussion of the equal protection argument see text beginning at note 70 infra, where the case of Green v. Dep't
of Welfare of the State of Del., 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967) is analyzed.
. It should lie noted that the Thompson court did not expressly invalidate
all residence requirements for welfare regardless of length of time, i.e., those
less than one year, but they did find that there was no administrative need
for a residence requirement. 270 F. Supp. at 338.
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recognized for many years. A series of cases has held that this
right is protected by the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution. 7 The first judicial indication of this proposition
may be found in the case of City of New York v. Miln 8 in which
the Court considered a New York statute requiring the masters
of vessels to report the name, place of birth, occupation, age and
last legal settlement of all passengers who landed with the intention of proceeding into New York City. Although the majority upheld the statute as a regulation under the police power
of the state, 9 Justice Story, dissenting, maintained that the statute was a regulation upon commerce and, therefore, in violation
of the commerce clause of the Constitution which expressly
grants this power to Congress." °
Commerce clause protection of the right to travel was given
further impetus in the Passenger Cases," which held that a state
tax on passengers arriving from foreign ports was invalid. While
Justice M'Lean, writing for the Court, rested his opinion squarely
on the commerce clause, 12 the three concurring Justices, in their
opinions, alluded to the commerce clause, but were less clear as
to whether they found the statute invalid because it was a state
attempt to regulate interstate commerce. As a result of The
Passenger Cases New York modified its statute to avoid the constitutional objection. Instead of a direct tax, the ship's owner
or consignee was required to supply a $300 bond to indemnify
the City of New York for any expense incurred on behalf of the
passenger named in the bond, or in lieu of the bond to pay a
fee of $1.50 per passenger. If the statute was not complied with,
a $500 penalty was imposed upon the ship's owner for each pauper for whom expense was incurred. This revised statute was
also held unconstitutional on commerce clause grounds by a
13
unanimous Court in Henderson v. New York.
The most recent consideration by the Supreme Court of the
application of the commerce clause to interstate travel is found
in the case of Edwards v. California.14 A California statute made
it a misdemeanor for residents to aid non-resident indigents in
entering the state. The Court held that the statute imposed "an
unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce,"1l reasoning
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8 cl. 3: "To regulate Commerce with foreign Na"

tions, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes ...
836 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
9
Id. at 108.
1oId. at 115.
1148 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
12 Id. at 300.
'1 92 U.S. (2 Otto.) 259 (1875).
14314 U.S. 160 (1941).
15 Id. at 173.
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that "it is settled beyond question that the transportation of persons is 'commerce' within the meaning of that [commerce clause]
provision."1
Justice Byrnes, speaking for the Court, concluded:
Its express purpose and inevitable effect is to prohibit the transportation of indigent persons across the California border. The
burden upon interstate commerce is intended
and immediate; it is
7
the plain and sole function of the statute.'
Although the states are forbidden by the commerce clause
to regulate the interstate travel of persons, this power would not
be denied to Congress. In fact, implementing this power, Congress has expressly authorized the states to require one year of
residence as a condition of eligibility for ADC.18 By enacting
such requirements, therefore, the states have not usurped any
congressional power, but have merely made use of authority
delegated to them. Consequently, the commerce clause argument
has little weight in such circumstances. 9 It is thus evident why
the court in Thompson did not rely on the commerce clause nor
on the majority opinion in Edwards v. California.
Even though the Thompson court was unable to rely upon
the cases which support a right to travel under the commerce
clause, it, nevertheless, found this right to travel protected by
20
the fourteenth amendment. In the case of Crandall v. Nevada
the Supreme Court, although rejecting the commerce clause argument, 21 held unconstitutional a tax upon all persons leaving the
state by commercial vehicle apparently on the premise that free
movement was a right of national citizenship. 22 Although the
opinion on this point is unclear, 23 Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Edwards, relied upon Crandallfor the proposition
that "the right to move freely from State to State was a right
16 Id. at 172.

Id. at 174.
31 42 U.S.C. §602 (6) (1959).
17

19 Because Congress has delegated authority to the states to enact residence requirements does not of itself make the requirements constitutional.
Congress may not have the authority to enact such requirements where they
violate constitutional rights. See text notes 31-40 infra. But the arguments
against the requirements are based primarily on the state violation of the
fourteenth amendment.
2073 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
21 Id. at 43. But see Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 444 (1935) (dissenting opinion of J. Stone).
22 73 U.S. at 49.
2
3See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920), in which the Court
limited the holding in Crandall. The Court stated that the statute "in that
case was held to directly burden the performance by the United States of
its governmental functions and also to limit rights of the citizens growing
out of such functions. .. . " Id. at 299. See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873). But see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908), in which the Court stated in discussing the privileges and immunities
of a United States citizen that "among the rights and privileges recognized
by this court are the right to pass freely from state to state, Crandall v.
Nevada." 211 U.S. at 97.
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of national citizenship, '

' 24

arguing that the California statute in

question "ran afoul of the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 2 5 In further developing the historical
basis for free movement as an incident of national citizenship,
Justice Douglas also looked to Chief Justice Fuller's opinion in
Williams v. Fears,26 in which it was said:
Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove
from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute
of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from
or through the territory of any state is secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution.27
Justice Jackson, concurring in Edwards, not only supported
the view that the right to travel is an inherent right of national
citizenship, but also concluded that it encompassed the right to

remain, stating:
[I]t is a privilege of citizenship of the United States, protected
from state abridgment, to enter any state of the Union, either for

temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent residence
therein and for gaining resultant citizenship thereof.
28
citizenship means less than this it means nothing.

If national

In light of this statement, the court in Thompson concluded that

"the right of interstate travel embodies not only the right to pass
through a state, but also the right to establish residence therein .

29

Not only is the right to travel protected from state abridgment by the fourteenth amendment, but the Supreme Court has
also held that it is protected by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment from congressional infringement. The Thompson court in order to complete their analysis of the right to
travel, relied on these Supreme Court decisions. In Kent v. Dulles-o
the secretary of state was held not to have the authority to refuse to issue passports to each of two plaintiffs because of their
refusal to file an affidavit concerning their membership in the
Communist Party. In discussing the right of foreign travel the
Court considered the right of travel generally:
The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the
citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the
24 314 U.S. at 179.
Justice Douglas found further support in Corfield
v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) which held: "The
right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise . ."
to be a privilege of state citizenship protected by art. IV, §2 of the Constitution. Id. at 552. But see Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939), which
rejected the argument of such a right under art. IV., §2.
253 14 U.S. at 181.

26179

U.S. 270 (1900).

27 Id. at 274.

But the Court in considering a tax on persons engaged in
hiring laborers to be employed beyond the limits of the state, held that the
tax did not amount to such an interference with the freedom of transit, or
of contact, as to violate the Federal Constitution.
28314 U.S. at 183.
29 270 F. Supp. at 336.
3 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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Fifth Amendment.... In Anglo-Saxon 3law that right was emerging at least as early as the Magna Carta. 1

Continuing, Justice Douglas expressed the right of free movement as "part of our heritage,"3 2 and "basic in our scheme of
33
values.
.
Six years later the case of Aptheker V. Secretary of State34
raised a similar problem. Certain ranking officials of the
Communist Party of the United States had their passports revoked under section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950.35 Justice Goldberg; speaking for the Court, held the
section to be unconstitutional in that it "too broadly and indiscriminately restricts the right to travel and thereby abridges the
liberty guaranteed by the fifth amendment."38 However, it
should be noted that in Zemel v. Rusk37 the Court indicated that
Congress may restrict the right to travel in certain limited circumstances, i.e., when it becomes necessary to preserve the welfare and security of the nation. 8
In summary, the Supreme Court in the case of United States
v. Guest 9 recently affirmed that:
Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis

within the court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass0 those differences
further.

All have agreed that the right exists.'
INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT. To TRAVEL

It would seem that a direct proscription against entry into
a state is an abridgment of the right to travel. However, it was
contended in Thompson that the right "is abridged by Connecticut's practice of denying ADC to those in plaintiff's situation because it chills their mobility;"'"1 thus implying that mere
discouragement of entry constitutes an unlawful abridgment of
the right to travel. To support this proposition which in effect
equates mere discouragement with direct proscription of entry,
the court relied upon the words of Justice Stewart in United
2
States v. Guest:4
Id. at 125.
321d. at 126.
31

88 Id...
34 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
35 50 U.S.C. §785 (1959).
38 378

.

U.S. at 505.

87381 U.S. 1 (1965).

38 Id. at 15-16.
39 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
40 Id. at 759.
41270 F. Supp. at 334 (emphasis added).
It is contended basically that
residence requirements discourage the mobility of those receiving welfare
in that a welfare recipient who desires to move to another state will not
have any means of support until he has satisfied the residence requirement
of the state into which he desires to move. Thus his movement is discouraged.
42 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Six private individuals were indicted under 18
U.S.C. §241 (1964) for conspiring to deprive Negro citizens of rights se-

cured to them by the Constitution and laws of the, United States.
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• . [I]f the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede
or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of that right, then, whether
or not motivated by racial discrimination, the conspiracy becomes
a proper object of the43 federal law under which the indictment in
this case was brought.

The court in Thompson reasoned that the Court in Guest, "By
employing the words 'impede' and 'oppress,' ...

must have con-

templated that the discouragement of interstate travel is also
forbidden."" It should be noted, however, that the facts in Guest
are radically different from those in Thompson.

The Guest in-

dictment charged that the conspirators planned to "impede" and
''oppress" free travel:
1. By shooting Negroes; 2. By beating Negroes; 3. By killing
Negroes; 4. By damaging and destroying property of Negroes;
5. By pursuing Negroes in automobiles and threatening them with
guns; 6. By making telephone calls to Negroes to threaten their
lives, property, and persons, and by making such threats in person; 7. By going in disguise on the highway and on the premises
of other persons; 8. By causing the arrest of Negroes by means
of false reports that such Negroes had committed 45criminal acts;
and 9. By burning crosses at night in public view.

It is therefore tenable that the Court in Guest considered the violent acts and threats of murder, damage and destruction to be
tantamount to proscription of the right of free travel, rather than
mere discouragement. It is thus doubtful that the Guest Court

ever contemplated the mere discouragement of the right to travel to be a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of
the fourteenth amendment.4

However, as noted in Thompson, stronger support for including "mere discouragement" within the ambit of an abridgement of the right of free movement is to be found in the concurring opinions of Edward v. California.4 7 The statute in that

case did not directly proscribe free movement but merely discouraged the right; the sanctions were imposed on the aiding
resident rather than the entering indigent. In other words, the
indigent was not directly prohibited from entering the state but
only discouraged from doing so by a limitation on his mode of
4Id. at 760 (emphasis added).
44 270 F. Supp. at 36.
45 383 U.S. at 747-48, n. 1.
.46 The Court in Guest was dealing with a conspiracy of individuals who
had allegedly joined to "impede" and "oppress" free mobility. The historical
development of the right has been in terms of protection from state abridgment of interstate travel. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, felt that "[while past cases do indeed establish that there is a
constitutional 'right to travel' between States from unreasonable governmental interference . .. ," there does not appear to be a constitutional protection for individual interference. 383 U.S. at 763. But see 383 U.S. at 759
n. 17 in which the majority in Guest expressed that the reasoning supports
the conclusion that interstate travel is free from any type of interference.
47 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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entry. Justice Douglas and Justice Jackson in their concurring
opinions held that the statute clearly abridged the right to
48
travel.
FIRST AMENDMENT ANALOGY

To strengthen its argument regarding the "chilling effect"
of the statute as an unconstitutional abridgment of free mobility
the court in Thompson found an analogy in the protection extended by the courts to the first amendment rights of freedom of
speech and religion:
Further support for the proposition that the right of interstate
travel also encompasses the right to be free of discouragement of
interstate movement may be found by analogy to cases proscribing
49

actions which have a chilling effect on First Amendment rights.
In developing this analogy, the court first cited the case of Dombroski v. Pfister"° which considered the problem of a civil rights
group threatened with prosecution for alleged violations of the
Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law.
A three-judge district court had held that the complaint failed to
allege sufficient irreparable injury to justify an injunction sought
by the civil rights group. 1 Justice Brennan in writing the opinion of the Supreme Court stated:
Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all of those subject to overboard regulations risk prosecution to test their rights. . . . If the
rule were otherwise, the contours of regulations would have to be

hammered out case by case -

and tested only by those hardy

48 See text at notes 24-28 supra. The Edwards decision still might be
distinguished in such a case since the statute involved in Edwards was enacted with the intent of discouraging the entrance of non-resident indigents.
Residence requirements arguably are not directly intended to prevent indigents from entering the state. But see the dissent in Thompson, in which
it is contended that what the residence requirement "does do and is intended
to do, is to deter those who would enter the state for the primary or sole
purpose of receiving welfare relief allotments." 270 F. Supp. at 339. The
court might also have considered the case of Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 35 (1867). In that case the tax which was found to inhibit free
travel was not intended to do so, see text and notes at notes 20-23 supra. See
also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), in which Justice Douglas and
Justice Goldberg concurring, indicated, in dicta, that state action is unconstitutional even if it merely hinders interstate movement. The Court in
Bell questioned:
... Is the right of a person to eat less basic than his right to travel,
which we protected in Edwards v. California... ? Does not a right to
travel in modern times shrink in value materially when there is no
accompanying right to eat in public places?
The right of any person to travel interstate, irrespective of race,
creed, or color is protected by the Constitution. Edwards v. California.
... Certainly his right to eat at public restaurants is as important in
the modern setting as the right of mobility. In these times that right
is indeed, practically indispensable to travel either interstate or intrastate.
Id. at 255.
49 270 F. Supp. at 336.
50 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
51 The court also abstained on the grounds that a possible narrowing of
the construction by the state court might avoid the constitutional issue.
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enough to risk52criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope

of regulation.
Thus the threat of criminal sanctions was considered to be as

effective a deterent as the actual application of the sanctions in
having a "chilling effect"5 3 whereby the civil rights group was
discouraged from exercising their first amendment rights.
To further support the first amendment analogy, the court
in Thompson relied upon the recent selective service case of
Wolff V. Selective Service Local Board No. 16. 54 The court in
Wolff held that the mere reclassification of students from "student-deferred" to "available for military duty" because of their
participation in anti-war protests gave rise to an immediate justiciable controversy which would permit a federal court to intervene and adjudicate the matter. The court declared that "the
mere threat of the imposition of unconstitutional sanctions
will cause immediate and irreparable injury to the free exercise
.. "" of first amendment rights.55 Again, as in Dombroski, the
mere threat of sanctions, i.e., reclassification alone, effectively
discouraged the exercise of free expression.56
Applying this first amendment analogy, the court in Thompson emphasized that "[d]enying to the plaintiff even a gratuitous benefit because of her exercise of her constitutional right
effectively impedes the exercise of that right. 5 , 7 The court found
direct support for its conclusion in the case of Sherbert v. Verner.58 There, the Supreme Court considered a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act. The claimant was a member of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church and was discharged by her employer because she would not work on Saturday, her Sabbath
Day. Unable to find any work that did not require her to be
present on Saturday, the claimant filed for unemployment compensation. Her initial claim was refused on the ground that a
claimant to be eligible for benefits, must be "[a]ble to work and
...

[a]vailable for work

. .

.

",9

and a claimant is ineligible if he

has failed to accept suitable work offered to him. 6°
Justice Brennan, in writing the opinion of the Court, held
that the denial of the claim imposed an unconstitutional burden

380 U.S. at 486-87.
"The chilling effect upon the exercise of first amendment rights may
derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its
success or failure." Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
54 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
52

53

55 Id. at 824.
56

Query, whether the withholding of economic welfare benefits pending

fulfillment of residency requirements is comparable to the sanction of selective service reclassification? But see text at notes 61-63 infra.
57

270 F. Supp. at 336.

58374 U.S. 398 (1963).
59 14 S.C. CODE ch. 3 §68-113 (3)
60 14

S.C. CODE ch. 3 §68-114 (3)

(1962).
(ii) (1962).
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In its analysis the Court

In a sense the consequences of such a disqualification to religious
principles and practices may be only an indirect result of welfare
legislationwithin the State's general competence to enact; it is true
that no criminal sanctions directly compel appellant to work a sixday week. 1

But the court continued:
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of
one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even 62though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.

In response to the view that the receipt of unemployment
compensation benefits is not a matter of right but, in fact, a
mere privilege, the Court in Sherbert stated that "[i]t is too late
in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression
may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon
a benefit or privilege.'63 The Court cited the case of Flemming
v. Nestor8 4 which considered Federal Social Security benefits as
a further exemplification of the concept. There, Justice Harlan
declared that "[t]he interest of a covered employee under the
Act is of sufficient substance to fall within the protection from
arbitrary governmental action afforded by the Due Process
Clause." 65 The Sherbert Court also found a similar assertion in
Speiser v. Randall66 in which the Court "emphasized that con61374
U.S. at 403 (emphasis added).
82
1d. at 404. The Sherbert Court cited Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1960).
But the Court in Braunfeld found, in considering the problem
of the effect of a Sunday Closing Law on those of the Jewish faith, that the
law was valid because of the overriding state interest in a common day of
rest.

63 374 U.S. at 404.

64363 U.S. 603 (1960).
65 Id. at 611. The Court

considered the validity of section 202 (n) of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §402(n) (1964), which provides for termination of benefits payable to an alien deported on the grounds of Communist
Party membership. In a 5 to 4 decision, Justice Harlan, writing the opinion
of the Court, found that the statute did not deprive the alien of property
rights in violation of the fifth amendment nor was he deprived of protection
from arbitrary government action afforded by the due process clause.
68 357 U.S. 513 (1958). The Constitution of California required that

tax exemptions be denied persons who advocated the unlawful overthrow
of the government, or who advocated the support of a foreign government
engaged in hostilities with the United States. The California Supreme
Court had construed this provision of the State Constitution as denying any
tax exemption to any person who engaged in speech which might be criminally punished consistently with the free-speech guarantees of the Federal
Constitution. To effectuate the state constitutional provision, the California
legislature enacted a statute requiring a property-tax exemption claimant
to sign a statement on his tax return declaring that he does not engage in
the proscribed advocacy. The United States Supreme Court, in considering
the case of a veteran who was denied a tax exemption because of his failure
to sign the oath, assumed that the California constitutional provision was
valid but held that the statute which required the oath was invalid because
it denied the claimant due process. Enforcement of the constitutional provision through procedures which placed the burden of proof and persuasion
on the taxpayers denied them freedom of speech without the procedural
safeguards required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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ditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate,
whatever their purposes, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of
first amendment freedoms."6 7
A statute which merely "chills" entry into a state may be, in
effect, an abridgment of the right to travel. The cases indicate
that a direct proscription of the right is not necessary and thus
mere discouragement may be sufficient to constitute a violation
of the privileges and immunities clause. In light of the expanding recognition by the Supreme Court of the right to travel,
and the parallelism found between that right and first amendment
rights, the court in Thompson concluded that: "Because Connecticut Gen. Stat. §17-2d has a chilling effect on the right to
travel, it is unconstitutional.""
EQUAL PROTECTION

While the opinion in the Thompson case is predicated primarily upon the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, it has not been the only constitutional provision invoked as a protection against the inequities of residence
requirements. The courts have also turned to the equal protection clause.69 In the case of Green v. Department of Public Welfare of the State of Delaware," the court found the Delaware welfare residence requirements to be in violation of such clause and,
7 1
therefore, unconstitutional.
Green moved to Delaware in order to find construction work.
Because of unexpected inclement weather causing days of unemployment, he was forced to apply for public aid. Such public assistance was temporarily granted, but when Green could not
verify satisfaction of Delaware's residence requirement, the assistance was terminated. Green reapplied and was again denied
aid because he had resided in Delaware for less than one year.
The court held that such residence requirements, "create an in67 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963).
68 270 F. Supp. at 336. The court does not, however, assert that the

right to travel is absolute. Even first amendment rights may be curtailed if there is an overriding state or national interest. See Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1960) note 62 supra; "clear and present danger" rule,
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Thus, if the first amendment
analogy is to be carried through, the right to travel may be abridged in the
public interest. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). But see Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUPREME COURT REvIEw 245
(Kurland ed.). Thompson implicitly concedes that if the residence requirements met the "reasonableness" test, see text and notes at notes 78-80 infra,
they would not have presented an unconstitutional abridgement of the right
to travel. 270 F. Supp. at 338.
69 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. "[Nor shall any State . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
70 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967).
See note 6 supra.
71270 F. Supp. at 178. The court in Thompson also stated: "Not only
does §17-2d abridge the right to travel and its concomitant right to establish
residence, but it also denies plaintiff the equal protection of the law." Id.
at 336.

318

The John MarshallJournalof Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 1 :307

vidious distinction as to the class represented by plaintiffs and
are, therefore, in violation of the equal protection clause. 7 2 But
the court placed the burden of showing that the classification
made by the statute 8 was unconstitutional on the plaintiff :74
Or, stated another way, in order to upset the statutory classification here involved as in violation of the equal protection clause,
plaintiffs must show that it is not based on differences 7which
are
5
reasonably related to the purpose of the statute involved.
Having emphasized the burden to be met by plaintiff, the
court in Green next analyzed the applicable Delaware statutory
provisions. Looking to the underlying purpose of the legislature
in enacting the State Public Assistance Code, 0 the court found
that policy to be
to promote the welfare and happiness of all people of the State,
by providing public assistance to all of its needy and distressed;
that assistance shall be administered promptly and humanely with
due regard for the preservation of family life.

....

77

With this purpose in mind the court applied the test rule
7
enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Morey v. Doud, 8
i.e., whether the discrimination is reasonably related to the purpose of the act which it is intended to limit,7 9 and considered

whether the residence requirements reasonably implemented the
purpose of the Delaware Welfare Act.80 The court concluded that
the residence requirement tends to frustrate the purpose of the
act in that it prevents prompt assistance to those who are in
72 Green v. Dep't of Public Welfare of the State of Del., 270 F. Supp.
173, 178 (D. Del. 1967). The court noted that the plaintiffs had exhausted
their administrative remedies as provided under the Delaware statutes. The
action was continued as a class action, see FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Both parties
moved for summary judgment, there being no material issue of fact.
73 DEa. C. ANN. tit. 31 §504 (Supp. 1966).
7 The court noted, "that the equal protection clause does not preclude
all discrimination by a state but only invidious discrimination." 270 F.
Supp. at 176. Thus under Green, residency classification does not appear on
its face to be inherently unconstitutional as would be the case if classification were based on race. See Loving v. Commissioner of Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967).
75 Green at 176.
See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) ; A. F. of L.
v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949); Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (concurring opinion of Justice Jackson). The court in Thompson applied a similar test: "The courts
must reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in
a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose." 270 F. Supp. at 336. See
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
76

DEL.

C.

ANN.

tit. 31 ch. 5 (Supp. 1966).

DEL. C. ANN. tit. 31 §501 (Supp. 1966).
78354 U.S. 457 (1957). See text at note 76 supra.
79 354 U.S. at 465.
80 The court in Thompson did not adhere to the approach of the court in
Green. Instead, it looked to the purpose of the Connecticut residence requirement statute. 270 F. Supp. at 336-37. See note 75 supra. "[A]
statutory discrimination must be based on differences that are reasonably related to the purpose of the Act in which it is found." (emphasis added.)
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 461 (1957). Thus the test is not whether the
discrimination itself is reasonable, but whether the discrimination is "reasonably related" to the act which it is intended to limit. See text and notes
at notes 88-89 infra.
7
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need, "and to that extent is the antithesis of 'humane.' ,,81 The
statutory discrimination based on length of residence was thus
found to have "no constitutional justification in the purpose
declared in the statute itself. 1'82
IN SUPPORT OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

The court in Green distinguished the Illinois Supreme Court
opinion in People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons.8 3

In that case

certain welfare claimants petitioned the court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the local relief officer to give them relief
funds denied them because they had not satisfied the three-year
residence requirement. The court held that the petitioners had
made only temporary departures from the particular governmental unit involved and, therefore, had in fact fulfilled the
residence requirements.14 The court stated that: "It is settled
that the police power may be exercised not only in the interest
of public health, morals, comfort and safety, but also for the promotion of the public convenience or the general welfare."8 5 The
Illinois court conceded that the statute regulating welfare may be
the subject of judicial review since "[t]he legislative determination as to what is a proper exercise of the police power is not necessarily conclusive," 86 but found that the legislature's desire to
prevent destitute persons seeking the most advantageous program from migrating into Illinois was reasonable in method and
87
purpose.
The court in Green, however, noted that the Illinois decision
antedated the Edwards case8 8 and, therefore, did not consider the
view presented by the concurring opinions of Justice Douglas and
81 Green at 177. The court also suggested that the residency requirement places "pressure on the solidarity of the family," and unduly presumes
that those who have not fulfilled the residency requirements "are not a part
of the state's needy and distressed." Id.
82d.
83 374 Ill. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940).
84 Id. at 566, 30 N.E.2d at 51.
85 Id. at 562, 30 N.E.2d at 49.
88 Id. at 563, 30 N.E.2d at 50.
87 Id. at 566, 30 N.E.2d at 51. A similar problem was considered by a
New York court in the case of In re Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417, 28 N.E.2d 895
(1940).
Although the majority decided the case without reaching the constitutional question, the dissent did reach the constitutional question and
found the statute valid, stating:
Freedom of residence is restricted as to citizens only while on relief.
• . . No interference is had with the right of any citizen to choose
and establish a home. What is controlled is the unrestricted imposition of indigent persons and families without settlement upon a community and State where they cannot establish a home because of their
indigent status. . . . Such conditions restrict individual rights and
freedom in the interest of the right, security and freedom of the rest
of the State.
Id. at 424, 28 N.E.2d at 904.
88 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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Justice Jackson in Edwards.9 Consequently the Green court concluded that: "The protection of the public purse, no matter how
worthy in the abstract, is not a permissible basis for differentiating between persons who otherwise possess the same status
9
in their relationship to the State of Delaware."
Voting Analogy:
State statutory residence requirements as prerequisites for
becoming a qualified voter have been judicially tested on several
occasions 1 and in each case have been affirmed. In the latest
case of Drueding v. Devlin,92 a resident of Pennsylvania moved
to Maryland and after residing there for several months at89 Id. at 177-86. The State of California in the Edwards case argued
that its interest in protecting the state treasury justified its statute under
its police powers, alleging that: Their coming here has alarmingly increased our taxes and the
cost of welfare outlays, old age pensions, and the care of the criminal,
the indigent sick, the blind and the insane.
Should the States that have so long tolerated, and even fostered, the
social conditions that have reduced these people to their state of poverty
and wretchedness, be able to get rid of them by low relief and insignificant welfare allowances and drive them into California to become
our public charges, upon our immeasurably higher standard of social
services? Naturally, when these people can live on relief in California
better than they can by working in Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas or
Oklahoma, they will continue to come to this State.
314 U.S. at 168. Justice Douglas and Justice Jackson, concurring in Edwards, stated that the state's desire to protect its treasury is not a valid
reason to "curtail the right of free movement of those who are poor or
destitute." 314 U.S. at 181. Similarly, the Thompson court concluded:
"Here, as there, [in Edwards] the burden on the state treasury does not
justify an enactment with an invalid purpose." 270 F. Supp. at 337.
While the concurring opinions in Edwards rest on the privileges and
immunities clause, the court in Green apparently considered that their rationale was also applicable to the equal protection clause.
But it should also be noted that the Green court did not discuss the intrinsic merit of the contention in Heydenreich regarding the alleged
need to discourage entry by those seeking higher welfare benefits, which
argument was also urged by the dissent in the Thompson case. The contention that residence requirements are necessary to discourage indigents from
entering the state for the sole or primary purpose of seeking higher benefits
ignores the generally accepted premise that most indigents move to another
state for other reasons, e.g., to be closer to their families, to look for better
jobs, etc. Ramos v. Health & Social Services Bd. of State of Wis., 276 F.
Supp. 474, 476 (E.D. Wis. 1967). See Harvith, The Constitutionality of
Residence Tests for General and CategoricalAssistance Programs,54 CALIF.
L. REV. 567 (1966); LoGatto, Residence Laws - A Step Forward or Backward?, 7 CATH. L. REV. 101 (1961).
90 Green at 177. The court in Green also considered the possibility that
the one-year residence requirement may be considered as a test for "intention
to remain 'indefinitely," which is an element for establishing domicile in
Delaware. The domiciliary, "is defined as one who is physically present in
See New York
Delaware with an intention to remain indefinitely." Id.
Trust Co. v. Riley, 24 Del. Ch. 354, 16 A.2d 772 (1940), aff'd, 315 U.S. 343
However, in Green the court found length of residency to be an
(1942).
unreasonable test for determining intention to remain. But the court pointed
out that it did not-reach the problem of whether a state may validly limit
its welfare benefits to its own domiciliaries. 270 F. Supp. at 178.
91 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898) ; Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S.
621 (1904); Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd per
curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
92 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964) aff'd per curiama, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
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tempted to register to vote in a national election.

He was re-

fused registration because he had not fulfilled the one year Maryland residence requirement.

The court held that the requirement

was not an irrational or unreasonable discrimination and therefore did not abridge the equal protection clause of the fourteenth

amendment.9 '
Drueding also indicated that the residence requirement ful-

filled certain administrative purposes which generally help to
prevent fraud and provide some means of assuring a concern for

community problems on the part of the voter.94 Similarly, the
Court in Carrington v. Rash,95 while it held unconstitutional a
Texas statute that prevented servicemen from voting, empha-

sized that, "Texas is free to take reasonable and adequate steps
*

.

. to see that all applicants for the vote actually fulfill the re-

quirement of bona fide residence. ' 19 6

However, because of the

differences in purpose between residence requirements for vot-

ing and welfare payments, and the need for immediacy in granting welfare payments as compared to granting the right to vote,
the court in Green concluded that an analogy between the two
was improper.9 1
Other Residence Requirements:

The dissenting judge in Thompson pointed out that "Connecticut has always freely exercised its sovereign right as a state,
to legislate and administer controls governing a myriad of com-

parable state services.""8 These controls include the fulfillment

of a residence requirement as a condition precedent to receiving
93 Id. at 723. The affirmance by the Supreme Court should be considered
in light of the fact that the Maryland legislature was then considering a
reduction of the residency period. The affirmance was also made at a period
when voting rights legislation was under consideration by Congress. See
Christopher, The Constitutionality of Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN.
L. REV. 1136 (1965).
See also Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
04 234 F. Supp. at 725.
See also Schmidhouse, Residency Requirements
for Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile Society, 61 MICH. L. REV. 823, 828
(1963).
05 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
9
6 Id. at 96. The majority in Thompson considered the possible relation
between voting residence requirements and, welfare residence requirements
and concluded:
[If there were here a time limit applied equally to all, for the purpose
of prevention of fraud, investigation of indigency or other reasonable
administrative need, it would undoubtedly be valid. Connecticut's Commissioner of Welfare frankly testified that no residence requirement is
needed for any of these purposes.
Thompson at 338. The court in Green also pointed out that one year was
an unreasonable length of time to withhold welfare payments for administrative
purposes. Green at 177.
97
Green at 178. The Green court points out that the residence requirement for voting does not inflict any physical hardships on an individual.
Denial of welfare payments, however, does involve physical hardships the extreme being starvation. The need for welfare aid is immediate.
98 270 F. Supp. at 340.
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For example, in order to receive

a Connecticut student scholarship, a student must reside within
the state for the twelve months prior to his application.9 To
qualify for aid for the instruction of a blind child, both the parent
and child must reside within the state one year before applica-

tion. 100 In order to vote, one must reside in the state for six
months.101 As a corollary to this requirement, in order to hold a
liquor permit, one must be an elector .02° In fact, the captains and
crews of boats who wish to take oysters 03 or scallopso4 from state
waters must satisfy a one-year residence requirement.
The question arises whether under its police power a state
may attach conditions to the benefits and services it provides.
The Thompson dissent seems to imply an affirmative answer and,
indicating that the majority by its decision has effectuated the
erosion of the police power of the state, concluded that if all these
established residence requirements were struck down as uncon-

stitutional: "Such a decree by judicial fiat would go far toward
completing the annihilation of the police powers, which were re-

served to the several states and to the people under the tenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution.' 0 0
This conclusion suffers from the fact that the imposition of

conditions under a state's police power has always been subject
to a judicial test of "reasonableness. ' 10 Such a test was applied
99 CONN.

GEN.

(Rev. 1958)
(Rev. 1958)
(Rev. 1958)
STAT. (Rev. 1958)

STAT.

100 CONN. GEN. STAT.
101 CONN. GEN. STAT.
102 CONN. GEN.
103 CONN. GEN.
104 CONN. GEN.

§10-116c.
§10-295(b).
§9-12.
§30-45(3).

STAT. (Rev. 1958) §26-212.
STAT. (Rev. 1958) §26-288.

105 270 F. Supp. at 340 (dissenting opinion). It should also be noted
that the dissenting judge felt that the majority had made their decision in
light of the social evils of the residence requirements rather than the constitutional issues involved. However, the dissent fails to particularize this
objection. A better presentation of this argument may be found in Smith
v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
106 See text and notes at notes 79-80 supra; Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp.
31 (M.D. Ala. 1967), appeal granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1967)
(No. 949), wherein a three-judge district court held unconstitutional the Alabama "substitute father" statute on equal protection grounds, while Justice
Black originally granted a stay of judgment he has now vacated such stay,
88 S. Ct. 842 (1968); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Calif.,
271 U.S. 583 (1926), in which the Court considered conditions for receiving
certain licenses. The Court noted that the licenses were privileges and not
rights and therefore the state could attach conditions. However, the Court
went on to state:
[Tlhe power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of
the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the
relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the
surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may,
in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that
guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus
be manipulated out of existence.
Id. at 593-94. As to state courts, see also Collins v. State Board of Social
Welfare, 248 Ia. 369, 81 N.W.2d 4 (1957); Danskin v. San Diego Unified
School District, 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946). See generally Reich,
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by the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Mercer v. Hemmings07 which held unconstitutional a section of a Florida statute
insofar as it required two years of residence within the state as
a prerequisite for certification as a public accountant. The court,
in holding that the restriction on the plaintiff violated his right
to the equal protection of the law, stated:
A statute enacted in the exercise of the police power must have
been passed to prevent some manifest evil or to preserve public
health, morals, safety or welfare. The test is always whether the
regulation is reasonable within those limits.108

The courts in Thompson and Green seem merely to have implemented this test in striking down statutory residence requirements.
Thus conditions may be attached as prerequisites to the receipt of services and benefits from the state, but such conditions
must be reasonable and thus not deny equal protection of the law
or other rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION

The courts have, in effect, found that the right of the individual to travel freely is more socially desirable than the state's
right to regulate its welfare program in order to protect its treasury. Residence requirements go beyond the limits of the police
power. Therefore to cure the abuses seemingly inherent in welfare programs it would appear that states must look to new modes
of protection, more limited in scope than residence requirements. 09
Whether there will now be a greater influx into those states
which offer high welfare benefits remains to be determined.
Studies made thus far of this question with respect to those
states which do not condition their welfare programs on residence
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 443 (1966).

194 So.2d 579 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1966).
Id. at 585. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), in which
the Court stated:
This court has never held that the States are required to establish
avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free from unreasonable distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts.
Id. at 310. Cf. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
i09 See Plaintiff's Brief in Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment at 37, Green v. Dep't of Public Welfare of the State of Del., 270
F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967), which suggests that statutes might be passed
that are less restrictive of individual rights. They might bar any person
whose sole or primary purpose in entering the state is to obtain higher welfare benefits. Certain rebuttable presumptions might be raised regarding intention and a list of factors to be considered might be provided. See, e.g.,
107
108

NEW YORK WELFARE AnUSE LAW, NEW YORK SOCIAL WELFARE LAW, §139a

(McKinney 1965).
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requirementsl ° have been inconclusive.'
Any present lack of
increase, however, could be attributed to a lack of awareness on
the part of indigents as to what states pay high benefits and do
not have residence requirements. Increased awareness of such
information by the indigent population may very well precipitate
an unduly burdensome imigration into the higher paying industrial states. It can therefore be anticipated that there will
be a strong clamor by these industrial states for federal intervention to impose minimum benefit standards upon all states
to help equalize the availability of benefits and thereby discour12
age oppressive migration.
Charles H. May, H

110 American Public Welfare Ass'n, PUBLIC WELFARE DIRECTORY (1967).
11 See Altmeyer, People on the Move: Effect of Residence Requirements

for Public Assistance, 9 SOCIAL SEC. BULL. 3, 5 (Jan. 1946); LoGatto,
Residence Laws - A Step Forwardor Backward?, 7 CATH. L. REV. 101, 10607 (1961); Comment, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare
Statutes, 51 IowA L. REV. 1080, 1084 (1966). *
112 See Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 10, 1967, at 26, Col. 1.

